Graf Spee - the man and the ship
December 17, 1939, Admiral Graf Spee, the German pocket battleship under the command of Captain Hans Langsdorf was scuttled by her own crew in the River Plate estuary.
Twenty five years earlier or December 8, 1914 to be precise, Vice Admiral Maximilian Von Spee on board his flagship, the armoured cruiser Scharnorst, though hoplessly inferior in speed and armaments, engaged the enemy to the bitter end.
What a contrasting epitaph to a famous name…Graf Spee.
Graf Spee, the man:
Maximilian Graf von Spee joined the Imperial German Navy at the age of seventeen and rose to the rank of Vice Admiral at the age of forty eight.
During the Battle of Falklands on December 8, 1914, his East Asiatic Squadron suprised a British naval unit moored at Stanley Harbour. The outcome would have been different if the ships under his command had continued attacking the enemy that were caught unprepared, and history would have been written differently.
Instead, it read “Spee’s cruisers, the Gneisenau and Nürnberg, approached Stanley (Harbour) first. At the time, the entire British fleet was coaling. Had Spee pressed the attack, not only would Sturdee’s ships have been easy targets, but any ship that tried to leave would have faced the full firepower of the German ships. Having a vessel sunk might also have blocked the rest of the British squadron inside the harbour.”
The failure to press on the advantage cost him dearly. He lost four cruisers, more than 2,000 sailors including his two sons and himself.
Graf Spee, the ship:
Admiral Graf Spee was commisioned in 1936 and for two years, it served as flagship of the German navy. Although her design and displacement was considerably smaller than a battleship or battle cruiser, she was regarded by the British as a ‘pocket’ battleship, in reference to the heavy firepower contained in the relatively small vessel.
While many WW2 naval battles were fought far out at sea, and the ships sunk in deep water never to be seen again, Admiral Graf Spee had a different and unusual conclusion. She was scuttled by her own crew in the estuary of River Plate exactly seventy years ago to this date.
Slow rewind to the Battle of the River Plate, December 13, 1939…Captain Hans Langsdorf committed a series of blunder that led to the capitulation.
Whether it was logical or absurd reasoning, either way, it was a grave mistake for Langsdorf to engage the enemy in a close encounter. He should have maneuvered and keep the British ships at a range where he could destroy them with his 11 inch shells while remaining out of effective range of the enemy’s smaller 6-inch and 8-inch guns.
After delivering crippling blows to the heavy cruiser, HMS Exeter, to the extent that all her guns were out of action, he could have finished her off if he had the ruthlessness of an uncompromising fighting man. He could also have finished off the damaged New Zealand light cruiser Achilles and the sole remaining British light cruiser Ajax. Instead of pursuing the enemy for the kill, Langsdorff decided to turn away and head for Montevideo, a decision that defied logic.
The decision or indecision of Langsdorf was best described by Captain Parry of Achilles who wrote: “To this day I do not know why the Admiral Graf Spee did not dispose us off in the Ajax and the Achilles as soon as she had finished with the Exeter”.
“Also, had the Graf Spee left port at this time, the damaged Ajax and the Achilles would have been the only Commonwealth warships that it would have encountered in the area as the heavy cruiser, HMS Cumberland only arrived at the scene on the night of December 14″.
Sensing the dilemma facing Langsdorff, the British exploited the situation to maximum effect. They quickly filled him with self doubt by clever utilisation of their propaganda machine. They feed false intelligence to the Germans that an overwhelming British force was being assembled, when in reality only the Cumberland and the two damaged light cruisers were nearby. Even then, the three ships were no match for Admiral Graf Spee. To reinforce the propaganda effect, these ships, which were waiting just outside the 3-mile limit, were ordered to ‘make smoke’, which could be clearly seen from the Montevideo waterfront.
Earlier, on December 2, Commodore Henry Harwood correctly guessed the future movement of the Graf Spee. Responding to a distress call by a merchant ship, Harwood, in command of the Royal Navy South American Cruiser Squadron, anticipated that Langsdorff would next move to strike the River Plate estuary. Without his foresight, Graf Spee would still be roaming the ocean causing havoc and misery to the merchant sailors.
The brilliance, commitment and fighting will of Harwood and his men led to the humiliating end and premature demise of Graf Spee.
Had Graf Spee been commanded by people like Harwood, the outcome would have been different.
Debates will continue whether Captain Langsdorf made the right decision from the moment he decided to close in on the enemy, to the final moments of the Graf Spee. Some believed that Captain Langsdorff gave the world a matchless example of personal integrity and human compassion in wartime but the fact remain that he failed to commit himself and his crew in the hour of need. He failed in his prime commitment to uphold the sovereignty of the German ensign on the Graf Spee.
Although Captain Hans Langsdorff was widely regarded by both Allies and Axis forces to be an extremely competent naval commander of unquestionable honour, his actions or inactions prior, during and after the battle showed otherwise. Respected historians have also dismissed him as a “first class person” and an unimaginative warrior.
Unimaginative is the exact description for Langsdorff and Von Spee. Both spurned the opportunity to destroy the enemy when they had the upper hand.
Langsdorf’s ultimate decision to scuttle his ship in the River Plate estuary on 17 December 1939, for reasons only known to himself, and which he took them to the grave when he committed suicide two days later did not absolve him from the blame.
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